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INTRODUCTION 
RDER Without Law, Robert Ellickson’s seminal account of social 
norms among Shasta County cattle ranchers,1 grew out of earlier 
research titled, in part, Of Coase and Cattle.2 The shift in the title was 
subtle, but significant. Ellickson started out to test Ronald Coase’s 
celebrated parable of the Rancher and the Farmer, the hypothetical that 
Coase used to develop the Coase Theorem,3 a major pillar of law and 
economics scholarship. Ellickson wanted to assess the impact of 
transaction costs in the real world by determining how ranchers 
identified trespass disputes and negotiated solutions.4
O 
Ellickson found something unexpected. He learned that transaction 
costs were significant, but they manifested themselves not via a 
particular allocation of property entitlements, but instead via a robust 
system of social norms. The ranchers of Shasta County governed 
themselves and their beasts informally, according to norms that were, in 
Ellickson’s estimation, welfare-maximizing. 
 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Email: madison@pitt.edu. 
1 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991). 
2 See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1986). 
3 See Robert Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
4 Ellickson, supra note 2, at 624. 
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Similar case studies are needed to understand the phenomenon of 
cultural “order without law.” The prospect of Coasean private ordering 
by close-knit groups might produce many of the innovation-related 
benefits of patent- or copyright-driven innovation, without the costs 
associated with enforcement of intellectual property laws. Whether this 
is so in practice is an empirical question. Until recently, there have been 
few data sets addressing it. 
Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman’s There’s No Free Laugh 
(Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the 
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy5 is one of a small number of recent 
case studies that supply relevant data.6 The major virtue of this work is 
that it does for the premise of Anglo-American intellectual property law 
what Ellickson did for Coase. It moves the discussion from theory to 
practice. Does intellectual property law supply incentives to produce and 
distribute creative goods? In some salient contexts, the answer is “no” 
or, at least, “not so much.” Oliar and Sprigman argue that stand-up 
comedians are creative and productive folks who live by a system of 
social norms, rather than by a system of intellectual property law. 
Not only does this comic code encourage creativity, it also apparently 
has something to do with comedy itself. Along with an Ellicksonian tale 
of norm-based social ordering by a group (not an Ellicksonian close-knit 
group, but an identifiable loose-knit group), Oliar and Sprigman tell a 
related and partially Demsetzian story of the evolution of these norms. 
Comedy once was a commons, but social norms privatized its contents. 
Here, I focus on what There’s No Free Laugh teaches other scholars. 
The challenge posed by Ellickson looms large. Ellickson went to 
Northern California looking for Coasean transactions, found something 
closer to the Balinese cockfight “thickly” described by Clifford Geertz,7 
and had the humility to write up what he found: a combination of 
5 Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 
Va. L. Rev. 1787 (2008). 
6 See Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property 
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 Org. Sci. 187 (2008) (French chefs); Kal Raustiala & 
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion 
Design, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687 (2006) (fashion designers); Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms 
and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey 
Copyright Law, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 651 (2006) (jambands and their fans). 
7 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1–11; Clifford Geertz, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese 
Cockfight, in The Interpretation of Cultures 412 (2000). 
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economics and culture.8 How might Oliar and Sprigman’s study form 
the basis for equally rich follow-on scholarship? The important lessons 
here may be partly what a thick version of law and economics can teach 
intellectual property law, and partly what a thick account of culture can 
teach law and economics. 
I. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF STAND-UP COMEDY 
Jokes look like public goods. A joke is non-rivalrous and non-
excludable. Once a comic tells a joke in public, without some 
mechanism to limit joke-copying, the comic has little ability to prevent 
free appropriation. As a result, returns on innovation are too low to 
sustain an incentive to produce fresh humor. Underproduction and 
overconsumption of jokes, a sort of tragicomic market failure, is the 
probable result.9
Since there appears to be no shortage of commercial, public humor, 
and since comics appear not to be resorting to formal intellectual 
property law as a classic property-based solution to the market problem, 
Oliar and Sprigman hypothesize that an informal intellectual property 
regime is doing the work instead. They describe a robust system of 
social norms that looks and sounds altogether like a formal copyright 
regime without the codification: exclusive rights, trespass norms, 
exceptions and exclusions, enforcement mechanisms, and so on. The 
shift to proprietary norms apparently began with the emergence of 
narrative- and perspective-driven comedy in the early 1960s among a 
new generation of stand-up comics suffused with the political 
independence and social unrest that came to characterize that decade. 
Oliar and Sprigman align the new comic norms and content with shifts 
in monitoring and enforcement costs during the 1960s. As the benefits of 
a propertized scheme rose it seems logical to suppose—as Oliar and 
Sprigman do10—that the benefit/cost balance associated with 
enforcement of property-like interests shifted in favor of propertization. 
This is consistent with Demsetz. Oliar and Sprigman are appropriately 
cautious in suggesting a causal connection, but their argument is 
nonetheless straightforward. 
8 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 280 (noting that the presence of transactions costs, rather 
than their absence, made the law irrelevant). 
9 The standard model characterizes the problem as a tragedy of the commons. 
10 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1859–63. 
  
30 Virginia Law Review In Brief [Vol. 95:27 
 
Suppose that the initial question were framed more broadly, so that 
instead of wondering about the role of social norms in solving 
underproduction and overconsumption concerns, scholars wondered 
about the ways in which comics are motivated to create and perform. 
The simple law-and-economics story of comedy and copyright may have 
a more complex theme. 
Why are comics? The odd syntax of that question hints at its breadth. 
This Part restates it narrowly, in standard law-and-economics terms. Are 
jokes really public goods? How was the failure cured? Given a rich set 
of social norms, to what extent do those norms solve that failure, prevent 
it—or cause it? In Part II, I restate the question in non-standard terms, an 
approach that yields a different but important set of issues. Together, the 
questions and issues described below define much of what might be 
missing in the underproduction account of intellectual property. 
Answering them may provide a more robust model of social ordering 
that scholars might use in the future. 
A. Are Jokes Public Goods? 
Consistent with the classic definition of a public good, “consumption” 
of a joke by one person does not decrease its availability to others. No 
one can be effectively excluded from accessing (or “getting”) the joke. 
But does this matter? Are jokes economically significant; that is, are 
they goods at all? To be sure, writers sell jokes and comics buy them. 
Should the question end there? 
Copyright law focuses on “original works of authorship.”11 When 
investigating alternatives to copyright, it seems natural that one should 
look for corresponding “things.” The history of modern humor suggests 
a plausible alternative explanation, grounded in the hypothesis that 
comic content is a type of input into stand-up comedy, rather than its 
output. As Oliar and Sprigman note,12 one striking feature of the history 
of early twentieth-century comedy is that comedy operated as what 
current scholars would call a productive cultural commons,13 or to adapt 
11 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
12 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1844–50. 
13 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment (Working Paper 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265793. 
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the title of a classic law review article, a commons of comedy.14 
Comics’ normative system treated comic content as freely available to 
other comics.15 Performers distinguished themselves in ways that had 
little to do with the novelty of the humor. Comic bits were a form of 
cultural infrastructure.16
There’s No Free Laugh focuses on what appears to be a late-
twentieth-century shift to a set of proprietary norms that characterizes 
jokes as ownable “things,” and a parallel shift in the content or style of 
stand-up comedy. Comics began to rely less on jokes and one-liners and 
more on narrative or perspective-oriented comedy.17
These shifts may have been more apparent than real. If comic content 
is a form of infrastructure or part of a commons, then the instrumental 
aim of stand-up comedy may be to produce something else, in fact, the 
same thing that comedy has always aimed to produce: laughter and the 
social bonding that laughter inherently and inevitably brings.18 In his 
classic account of comedy, Henri Bergson argued that laughter is a 
social corrective that allows humans to evolve with and adapt to society, 
to align themselves in response to the demands of artificiality.19 People 
are elastic and dynamic. The world around them appears to be inelastic 
and static. In Bergson’s phrase, comedy is “[s]omething mechanical 
encrusted on the living.”20 Many people adapt well to that inelasticity, 
but some fail. Rather than exclude those people from society, we 
embrace them. Laughter is that embrace, a socially-acceptable way of 
recognizing socially inappropriate things, or a form of social glue.21
14 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711 (1986). 
15 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1841–50. 
16 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 917, 1004–22 (2005) (describing the role of infrastructure in 
creating cultural value). 
17 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1850–53. 
18 One might put the point in the following economic terms: comedy is not a depletable 
resource; additional consumption yields additional economic and/or social value. 
19 See Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic 86–88 
(Cloudesley Brereton & Fred Rothwell trans., Macmillan Co. 1914) (1900). 
20 Id. at 37. Erich Segal modernized Bergson with a gloss on the legendary catch-phrase 
from Segal’s novel Love Story: “Comedy means never having to say you’re sorry.” I heard 
Segal make this statement during a lecture at Yale. 
21 Oliar and Sprigman limit this phrase to the “communal” humor of the post-vaudeville 
era. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1858. 
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Comic content depends not only on the comics who point to these 
mechanical “encrustments.” The encrustments themselves depend on the 
character of society at any given time. What is funny today may not 
have been funny before. Some humor holds up over time, and some does 
not. Oliar and Sprigman diagnose a shift in comic content beginning 
around 1960, which they connect to other, contemporaneous social and 
cultural changes.22 A new, young President took office. The conformity 
of the 1950s was giving way to a society that encouraged more 
individual expression. 
If Bergson is correct, then what changed in that era was not the mode 
of ownership, but instead the formula for the glue. Laughter was (and 
remains) what comics produce. We began to laugh at different things 
because there were different things to laugh at. The shift that Oliar and 
Sprigman detect was not a shift from commons to a form of private 
property, but a shift in how the commons is governed. 
A shift in governance is a significant development, but it is one with 
different implications for intellectual property policy. Rather than 
wondering about the production of novelty or about the shape of markets 
for comic things, we want to know where comedy comes from and how 
it is accessed and used. 
B. Did Norms Solve a Tragicomic Market Failure? 
Assume that stand-up comedy does exhibit public goods 
characteristics, and that comedy is subject to the standard market failure 
account. The fact that jokes are public goods means that conventional 
markets will not emerge of their own accord. Private property rights 
enable appropriability and sustain markets.23 There’s No Free Laugh 
focuses on comics’ assertion of proprietary interests against one another, 
but discounts the role of formal intellectual property rights in favor of a 
system of social norms. 
Formal intellectual property rights may nonetheless have played a key 
role in creating markets for stand-up comedy, and norms may have been 
relatively unimportant as incentives to create. The early 1960s, which 
saw the beginning of narrative and perspective-oriented comedy, also 
witnessed comics starting to do what authors have done for centuries, 
22 See id. at 1850–51. 
23 Other standard solutions include government subsidies to private producers and 
government provisioning of the goods. 
  
2009] Of Coase and Comics 33 
 
using the tools that copyright has long recognized as intrinsic to markets 
for creativity. They sold copies of their works. 24 And they sold lots of 
them.25
LPs by a wide variety of comedians earned gold record recognition 
during the 1960s and 1970s (“gold” meaning certified by the Recording 
Industry Association of America as having sold 500,000 units). The first 
comic gold record was The Button-Down Mind of Bob Newhart,26 which 
was released in 1960 and was certified “gold” in 1962.27 Newhart’s 
follow-up release, The Button-Down Mind Strikes Back, went gold in 
1967.28 Other comics with gold records during the 1960s and 1970s 
included the Smothers Brothers (1966 and 1967), Bill Cosby (four gold 
records in 1966, two more in 1967, and one in 1968), Flip Wilson 
(1970), Cheech and Chong (four gold records during the 1970s), George 
Carlin (also with four gold records), Richard Pryor (four), and Steve 
Martin (two).29 This parade of top-selling records does not account for 
the many other LPs released by comics during the 1960s, including 
notable releases by Nichols and May, Stan Freberg, Carl Reiner and Mel 
Brooks, Dick Gregory, and Jonathan Winters.30 In the 1970s, Robert 
24 There’s No Free Laugh notes this development in passing. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra 
note 5, at 1813 n.66 (noting the role of recorded performances in monitoring joke-stealing). 
25 Most of the copyright-related benefits of album sales likely did not inure to the benefit 
of comics themselves. That is consistent with one of copyright’s basic themes. Copyright is 
often an incentive for publishers rather than an incentive for authors. 
 Current copyright law would classify these works as sound recordings. Federal statutory 
protection for sound recordings was added to the Copyright Act only as of 1972. Prior to that 
date, sound recordings were protected under state copyright or unfair competition laws. 
26 See Ronald L. Smith, Comedy on Record: The Complete Critical Discography 727 
(1988). 
27 Two other comedy albums, Allan Sherman’s My Son the Folk Singer and Vaughn 
Meader’s The First Family (a celebrated parody of the Kennedy household), were both 
certified gold in 1962. Id. The recording market included not only middle class comics like 
Newhart but also the pacesetters Mort Sahl and Lenny Bruce. Mort Sahl released several top 
selling albums in the late 1950s and early 1960s. See id. Lenny Bruce’s Sick Humor was 
nominated for a Grammy award in 1959 in the inaugural competition for “Best Spoken Word 
Comedy.” It lost to Inside Shelley Berman. Id. at 723. 
28 Smith, supra note 26, at 728. 
29 Steve Martin’s 1978 release, Wild and Crazy Guy, was certified platinum, signifying 
1,000,000 units sold. The platinum recognition system was initiated in 1976. Martin’s Let’s 
Get Small, released and recognized as a gold record in 1977, was certified platinum in 1978. 
Id. at 727–28. 
30 See id. at 723. 
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Klein, David Steinberg, and Lily Tomlin also released successful 
comedy albums.31
The comedy recordings of the 1960s and 1970s, virtually all of which 
were characterized by the narrative comedy that emerged at the 
beginning of that era, were grounded partly in technology. The LP 
format that emerged as a technological standard in the late 1940s gave 
comics more time to talk. They took advantage of that opportunity by 
telling stories rather than one-liners. Oliar and Sprigman situate that 
development in a loose Demsetzian propertization argument.32 
Identifying and punishing thieves became easier. Story-telling 
discouraged commodification of comedy and discouraged theft. Yet 
comics may have turned to story-telling not to avoid appropriation of 
their work by others but to enable appropriation for themselves. 
Storytelling was not only technologically feasible, it also sold extremely 
well. 
“The comedy album phenomenon of the 1960s”33 was also grounded 
solidly in economics. The copyright system imagines that creators will 
appropriate the value of their work by charging consumers to access it; it 
imagines that the work gets shared via distribution of copies. Selling 
records worked for comics like it worked for musicians, and like selling 
books worked for authors. Higher-tier comics made a decent living. 
Lower-tier comics were stirred to emulate their more famous and 
successful colleagues. Top-selling comedians were offered starring roles 
on television programs and in Hollywood movies.34 By the late 1970s, 
comedy stars “had become the popular equivalent of rock stars.”35 From 
the standpoint of comedy fans, records made comedy accessible to 
audiences that could not afford to attend live shows or did not want to. 
31 See Laurence Maslon, Make ‘Em Laugh: The Funny Business of America 229 (2008). 
The pace declined in the early 1980s. Two albums by Eddie Murphy were certified gold in 
1984, and one of those (Eddie Murphy) was certified platinum in 1985. Several of Cosby’s 
and Pryor’s earlier gold records were certified platinum in 1986. See Smith, supra note 26, at 
728. 
32 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1859–64. 
33 Maslon, supra note 31, at 228. 
34 Comics starring in television series included Bill Cosby (I Spy, which premiered in 
1965), Tom and Dick Smothers (The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour, in 1967), Flip 
Wilson (The Flip Wilson Show, in 1970), and Bob Newhart (The Bob Newhart Show, in 
1972). See The Internet Movie Database (IMDb), available at http://www.imdb.com (last 
visited March 21, 2009). 
35 See Maslon, supra note 31, at 229. 
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This golden era faded during the 1980s with the rise of cable 
television and pre-recorded videocassettes. That means that the 
hypothetical market failure on which There’s No Free Laugh is 
premised either has long been solved via conventional property 
mechanisms (if successors to LPs offered equal or better appropriability 
mechanisms), or that the specific combination of conventional property 
mechanisms and social norms that Oliar and Sprigman describe emerged 
more recently than they hypothesize (if appropriability declined). As 
with a re-assessment of the public goods argument regarding jokes, this 
change in the historical account of markets does not make the 
emergence of a normative regime unimportant. But setting a system of 
social norms side-by-side with a conventional copyright-based 
appropriation regime colors the significance of both. If There’s No Free 
Laugh is correct about the emergence of comedy’s modern social norms 
during the 1960s, then it may be wrong about the source of the 
Demsetzian trend toward informal propertization. Copyright markets 
may have served comics well. 
C. Do Social Norms Cure Market Failure Among Stand-up Comics? 
That speculation about timing leads to further speculation about 
causal relationships. It raises the possibility that There’s No Free Laugh 
implicitly reverses cause and effect, or aligns the rise of social norms 
with a market failure when the two may have little to do with one 
another. Assume that there was a market failure in stand-up in the early 
1960s. Consider several possible scenarios: First, as There’s No Free 
Laugh suggests, narrative comedy and informal property in jokes might 
have emerged to solve it. Or, second, a market for comedy (the record 
market, described in the last section) might have emerged in response to 
emerging comedy norms that defined appropriate comic content and 
regulatory norms. Comic content might have evolved for social or 
cultural reasons independent of appropriability concerns, and the 
resulting narrative performance mode was especially well suited to a 
technological format—the long-playing record—that recently had 
become popular. Or, third, the comic market might have functioned well 
until the mid-1980s, and then failed, to be supplanted by a system of 
informal norms. Narrative and perspective-oriented comedy might have 
been the victim of its own success, especially for performers whose style 
was especially “visual.” Compared to LPs (and compact discs), cable 
television and pre-recorded video formats offered consumers superior 
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substitutes for live story-based performances. Those media offered 
important appropriation opportunities to comics, but their growing 
ubiquity also enhanced both opportunities to detect appropriation by 
competitors, and to punish theft. Did a Demsetzian trend emerge in 
response? 
To test any of these hypotheses, one would need to talk to both 
consumers (including consumers from different eras) and comics 
(including older ones still living). The questions to ask and the 
information to gather would not focus only on markets and objects and 
incentives. The questions and information would deal with patterns and 
practices as well as incentives to produce and interests in the new. 
When, how, and why did video formats supplant records as the 
dominant form of comedy consumption outside of live performance? It 
would be the anthropologist Geertz sketching the comedy of copyright 
and the commons of comedy, a content-based cultural infrastructure 
with governance and norms described as they relate to law, LPs, and 
history. Scholars often assume that a tragedy of the commons predicts 
the rise of intellectual property law, or intellectual property norms. A 
thick law and economics inquiry could ask which came first, and why. 
II. THE CULTURE OF COMEDY 
The point of Part I was to suggest that law and economics can be 
richer than it appears. Social norms need not align with the expectations 
defined by the legal system, and even the expectations defined by the 
legal system may be characterized in multiple ways. 
In this Part I suggest that future case studies of artistic communities 
might couple the law and economics framework with a perspective 
grounded in descriptive social science. If Ellickson’s Coasean analysis 
of Shasta County cattle ranchers came to embrace an ethnographic 
account of how those ranchers live, then there is no reason why 
ethnography or something like it should not form part of the 
investigation in the first place. There are potentially important aspects of 
the comic context that a Coasean or Demsetzian approach does not call 
out. There’s No Free Laugh suggests at least three lines of questioning. 
  
2009] Of Coase and Comics 37 
 
A. Where Do Comics Come From? 
The proposition that stand-up comedy is a communal activity defined 
by an evolving set of social norms begs an obvious but crucial question: 
Who are stand-up comics? 
First, it would be useful to know more about the internal dynamics of 
the comic community. There are local comics and national comics, 
comics who score television appearances and comics who work the 
comedy club circuit exclusively. There are famous comics and workaday 
comics. Some of these distinctions emerge in There’s No Free Laugh 
when the question of sanctions comes up. Famous comics are less likely 
to be punished for violating comic norms.36 Does the strength of other 
stand-up comic norms vary across this community, and if so, how? 
Given that stand-up norms have evolved over time, related questions 
of internal communal structure could be asked for each relevant period. 
What did the community of comics look like in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the moment when the shift to more propertization seems to have 
begun? How had that structure changed since the vaudeville and post-
vaudeville eras, when the content of comedy was apparently more self-
consciously communal? 
It would also be useful to know how one becomes a member of the 
stand-up “tribe,” and also how one loses one’s place. In Part I, I pointed 
out that record albums by Bob Newhart inaugurated the gold-record era 
of comedy LPs. Newhart, who has the self-consciously bland demeanor 
of a stereotypical accountant, was a real accountant before he took the 
stage.37 It seems unlikely that the stand-up community embraced him 
immediately, or that he felt the pull of the community’s norms right 
away. Tribes often have initiation rituals and symbols that mark tribal 
status. How are norms of stand-up comedy passed from current 
members to new members? Who decides who is a member of the tribe, 
and who is not? Is it comics themselves? Audiences? Do intermediaries 
such as comedy club owners play a role? 
It seems likely that norms against joke-stealing, like any communal 
norms, might serve as barriers to entry. There’s No Free Laugh makes 
this point indirectly, when it describes how reputational sanctions for 
violating comic norms may keep thieving comics from working.38 
36 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1824. 
37 Maslon, supra note 31, at 228. 
38 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1816–19. 
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Alternatively, if norms against joke stealing encourage comics to 
develop and rely on their own perspectives and narratives, comics’ 
social norms might promote entry. Anyone with a story to tell could get 
up on stage and try their hand. Exactly how to measure competition in 
this market would be difficult, and distinguishing the role of social 
norms may be impossible. Yet it would be worthwhile to investigate the 
impact of the normative system on the shape of the group. 
As comics come in, they may also leave. Is that possible? Or is it the 
case that once a stand-up comic, always a stand-up comic, regardless of 
the performance context? Do norms follow the individual, or do they 
stay within the community? To take a salient current example, is Robin 
Williams still subject to comics’ norms now that he has been a television 
and movie star for 30 years? Williams still performs on stage, yet he 
claims to have opted out of the stand-up community.39
B. Expressive Norms 
The story told in There’s No Free Laugh is ultimately only partly a 
story about solving an incentives problem among stand-up comics. 
Audiences appear to care little for new comic works,40 though it seems 
likely that they lust for new comics.41 Comics’ own attitude toward 
novelty seems to be less important than their attitude toward thievery. 
Given the vehemence of norm-based sanctions against plagiarism, 
comics themselves seem to value honesty at least as much as they value 
creativity, and perhaps more.42 Mostly, therefore, There’s No Free 
Laugh reads as a story about ethics. Stand-up comics live by a kind of 
code, a way of realizing a form of the good life, measured partly by 
honor that prevents most thievery, an attribution norm that fills gaps in 
the code of honor, and frontier justice meted out infrequently but 
flamboyantly. 
A system of social norms that operates as an ethical regime opens the 
door to asking more broadly about the functions and meanings of 
participating in that system. There’s No Free Laugh reminded me of 
Lawrence Lessig’s account of social norms among gentlemen in the 
39 See id. at 1816. 
40 See id. at 1824. 
41 It is possible that comics’ system of antiplagiarism norms acts as a proxy for audience 
interests in new content. Similarly, professional journalists prize a first-to-publish system of 
norms that focuses on “scooping” the competition. 
42 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1815–19. 
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antebellum American south, which encouraged dueling as a method of 
resolving offenses against honor and marking membership in the social 
elite.43 The rituals of dueling were highly elaborated, in order to 
manufacture prestige at different levels of society and to ensure that the 
ultimate sanction for an offense to honor—death—was meted out only 
after an intricate dance.44 Whether the comparison is to antebellum 
dueling or Balinese cockfights, the norms of stand-up comics may have 
expressive meanings and functions of their own. Some of these may be 
the markers of tribal belonging to which the last section referred. It 
seems self-evident but noteworthy, for example, that only a stand-up 
comic gets pummeled (literally) for joke-stealing.45
C. Comic Content 
There’s No Free Laugh carefully tiptoes around a third and perhaps 
most tantalizing question. Oliar and Sprigman argue convincingly that 
the content of the law (and the content of corresponding or 
complementary social norms) influences not only the amount of creative 
content that is produced, but its type.46 They also conclude that their 
evidence suggests that social norms should be considered by 
policymakers when deciding when and how to adjust the default rules of 
copyright law.47 This suggests a further question: Do the norms of the 
stand-up comic community make comedy better, or do they make it 
worse? How should policymakers deal with social norms? Ellickson 
ultimately concluded that Shasta County cattle ranching norms were 
welfare-maximizing. What of Coase and comics?48
Evaluative judgments of this sort are speculative and may be 
dangerous. Mainstream copyright scholarship avoids questioning the 
value of expressive content, for reasons best expressed in the so-called 
“anti-discrimination principle” articulated by Justice Holmes in Bleistein 
43 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 968–
72 (1995). 
44 See id. at 968–70. 
45 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1820–21. 
46 See id. at 1853–59. 
47 See id. at 1793–94. 
48 This form of the question is irresistible, even though it does not quite track the argument 
of There’s No Free Laugh. 
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v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.49 I question it anyway, with due 
humility. Whether and how law and/or norms maximize welfare is an 
important question, and no useful answers come from not considering all 
of its angles. This seems especially important if subconscious or implicit 
biases about what is “good” content and “bad” content might affect 
public policy. Those biases should be exposed and assessed. 
One possibility is that if comics use norms to discipline the profession 
and are satisfied with the results (Oliar and Sprigman do not present 
evidence to the contrary), then neither law nor society should second-
guess their judgment. One need not adopt the comic perspective to reach 
that conclusion. I have suggested elsewhere that normative communities 
may tend to be welfare-promoting from the standpoint of the copyright 
system, because they tend to be productive and creative.50 Stand-up 
comics’ norms may signal the presence of an inherently welfare-
promoting group. 
There are less sanguine alternatives. One is that antiplagiarism norms 
developed by stand-up comics run contrary to what might be called the 
OTSOG tradition, borrowing the acronym that Robert Merton used in 
his retracing of Newton’s restatement of the cumulative nature of 
creativity: “If I have seen further, it is by standing On the Shoulders of 
Giants.”51 The collaborative current flows swiftly in contemporary 
copyright scholarship, which often argues that creativity is cumulative 
and collective; that borrowing from forbears is inevitable, necessary, and 
right; and that laws that resist the practice are impediments to progress.52 
Stand-up comics appear to have internalized the notion of the “romantic 
author” that some scholars suggest has warped popular and policymaker 
perceptions of law and policy,53 and that has interfered with the 
production of new and better creative content. 
49 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). 
50 See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1525, 1677–87 (2004). 
51 Robert K. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript (Univ. of Chi. 
Press 1993) (1965) (initial capitals added to clarify the source of the acronym). 
52 See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 Buff. Intell. 
Prop. L.J. 3 (2001) (rethinking copyright’s notion of progress in light of the OTSOG 
principle). 
53 See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 
1991 Duke L.J. 455. The “romantic author” critique has itself been criticized recently. See 
Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values 
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A final hypothesis is more acutely negative. To ask whether comics’ 
norms make comedy better or worse is not merely to ask whether one-
liners are better or worse than personal reflections. It is to ask about 
relationships between stand-up comedy and other forms of comedy, and 
between stand-up comedy and theatrical performance, and orality in 
general. The evolution of comic content and social norms described in 
There’s No Free Laugh may be consistent with “the death of comedy” 
over the course of the twentieth century. That phrase comes from the 
classics scholar Erich Segal, who diagnoses the demise of comedic 
theater at the hands of individualistic and self-indulgent twentieth-
century modernists (Beckett) and absurdists (Ionesco).54 Classic comedy 
has a happy ending, and happiness is social. Men and women pair off 
and form communities. Twentieth-century theatrical comedy is 
solipsistic and cynical. Segal concludes that the change is a bad thing. 
As Oliar and Sprigman describe comics’ norms, those norms seem to 
reinforce it. 
III. CONCLUSION 
A short Response can only hint at the possibilities for further research 
here. My main points can be summarized briefly. Case studies, such as 
the one that There’s No Free Laugh presents, offer precisely the kind of 
raw material that intellectual property scholars and policymakers need to 
develop. Undertaking a case study requires making some key choices 
regarding the kinds of questions to be asked. The study might be framed 
in the relatively narrow terms given by the received understanding of 
intellectual property law as an incentive to create. Highlighting the 
contrasts between the predictions of the legal system and the actions of 
actors in the relevant case can highlight the strength or weakness of the 
law in action. That is the approach that There’s No Free Laugh largely 
takes. In highlighting the existence of a relevant set of social norms, that 
approach pays off. The narrowness of that approach also means that the 
policy payoff may be less valuable than it appears, because the framing 
did not create opportunities to describe the case in full. The research 
question for further cases is not only whether social norms offer a 
substitute for law. Future case studies should characterize and interpret 
in Early American Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 186 (2008) (describing copyright’s historical 
conceptions of authorship). 
54 See Erich Segal, The Death of Comedy (2001). 
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the patterns and meanings that define and emerge from a social domain 
and use those findings to build a robust foundation for law and other 
forms of social order. 
 
